We consider a causal inference problem frequently encountered in online advertising systems, where a publisher (e.g., Instagram, TikTok) interacts repeatedly with human users and advertisers by sporadically displaying to each user an advertisement selected through an auction. Each treatment corresponds to a parameter value of the advertising mechanism (e.g., auction reserve-price), and we want to estimate through experiments the corresponding long-term treatment effect (e.g., annual advertising revenue). In our setting, the treatment affects not only the instantaneous revenue from showing an ad, but also changes each user's interaction-trajectory, and each advertiser's bidding policy -- as the latter is constrained by a finite budget. In particular, each a treatment may even affect the size of the population, since users interact longer with a tolerable advertising mechanism. We drop the classical i.i.d. assumption and model the experiment measurements (e.g., advertising revenue) as a stopped random walk, and use a budget-splitting experimental design, the Anscombe Theorem, a Wald-like equation, and a Central Limit Theorem to construct confidence intervals for the long-term treatment effect.

Appendix A.2 presents the details of the simulated advertising system experiments

Recently, auto-bidding technique has become an essential tool to increase the revenue of advertisers.

Auto-bidding is central to computational advertising, achieving notable commercial success by optimizing advertisers' bids within economic constraints. Recently, large generative models show potential to revolutionize auto-bidding by generating bids that could flexibly adapt to complex, competitive environments. Among them, diffusers stand out for their ability to address sparse-reward challenges by focusing on trajectory-level accumulated rewards, as well as their explainable capability, i.e., planning a future trajectory of states and executing bids accordingly. However, diffusers struggle with generation uncertainty, particularly regarding dynamic legitimacy between adjacent states, which can lead to poor bids and further cause significant loss of ad impression opportunities when competing with other advertisers in a highly competitive auction environment. To address it, we propose a Causal auto-Bidding method based on a Diffusion completer-aligner framework, termed CBD. Firstly, we augment the diffusion training process with an extra random variable t, where the model observes t-length historical sequences with the goal of completing the remaining sequence, thereby enhancing the generated sequences' dynamic legitimacy. Then, we employ a trajectory-level return model to refine the generated trajectories, aligning more closely with advertisers' objectives. Experimental results across diverse settings demonstrate that our approach not only achieves superior performance on large-scale auto-bidding benchmarks, such as a 29.9% improvement in conversion value in the challenging sparse-reward auction setting, but also delivers significant improvements on the Kuaishou online advertising platform, including a 2.0% increase in target cost.

Reinforcement learning (RL) for auto-bidding has shifted from using simplistic offline simulators (Simulation-based RL Bidding, SRLB) to offline RL on fixed real datasets (Offline RL Bidding, ORLB). However, ORLB policies are limited by the dataset's state space coverage, offering modest gains. While SRLB expands state coverage, its simulator-reality gap risks misleading policies. This paper introduces Model-based RL Bidding (MRLB), which learns an environment model from real data to bridge this gap. MRLB trains policies using both real and model-generated data, expanding state coverage beyond ORLB. To ensure model reliability, we propose: 1) A permutation equivariant model architecture for better generalization, and 2) A robust offline Q-learning method that pessimistically penalizes model errors. These form the Permutation Equivariant Model-based Offline RL (PE-MORL) algorithm. Real-world experiments show that PE-MORL outperforms state-of-the-art auto-bidding methods.

Many online advertising platforms provide advertisers with auto-bidding services to enhance their advertising performance. However, most existing auto-bidding algorithms fail to accurately capture the auto-bidding problem formulation that the platform truly faces, let alone solve it. Actually, we argue that the platform should try to help optimize each advertiser's performance to the greatest extent -- which makes $\epsilon$-Nash Equilibrium ($\epsilon$-NE) a necessary solution concept -- while maximizing the social welfare of all the advertisers for the platform's long-term value. Based on this, we introduce the \emph{Nash-Equilibrium Constrained Bidding} (NCB), a new formulation of the auto-bidding problem from the platform's perspective. Specifically, it aims to maximize the social welfare of all advertisers under the $\epsilon$-NE constraint. However, the NCB problem presents significant challenges due to its constrained bi-level structure and the typically large number of advertisers involved. To address these challenges, we propose a \emph{Bi-level Policy Gradient} (BPG) framework with theoretical guarantees. Notably, its computational complexity is independent of the number of advertisers, and the associated gradients are straightforward to compute. Extensive simulated and real-world experiments validate the effectiveness of the BPG framework.

Auto-bidding is essential in facilitating online advertising by automatically placing bids on behalf of advertisers. Generative auto-bidding, which generates bids based on an adjustable condition using models like transformers and diffusers, has recently emerged as a new trend due to its potential to learn optimal strategies directly from data and adjust flexibly to preferences. However, generative models suffer from low-quality data leading to a mismatch between condition, return to go, and true action value, especially in long sequential decision-making. Besides, the majority preference in the dataset may hinder models' generalization ability on minority advertisers' preferences. While it is possible to collect high-quality data and retrain multiple models for different preferences, the high cost makes it unaffordable, hindering the advancement of auto-bidding into the era of large foundation models. To address this, we propose a flexible and practical Generative Auto-bidding scheme using post-training Search, termed GAS, to refine a base policy model's output and adapt to various preferences. We use weak-to-strong search alignment by training small critics for different preferences and an MCTS-inspired search to refine the model's output. Specifically, a novel voting mechanism with transformer-based critics trained with policy indications could enhance search alignment performance. Additionally, utilizing the search, we provide a fine-tuning method for high-frequency preference scenarios considering computational efficiency. Extensive experiments conducted on the real-world dataset and online A/B test on the Kuaishou advertising platform demonstrate the effectiveness of GAS, achieving significant improvements, e.g., 1.554% increment of target cost.

Auto-bidding plays a crucial role in facilitating online advertising by automatically providing bids for advertisers. Reinforcement learning (RL) has gained popularity for auto-bidding. However, most current RL auto-bidding methods are modeled through the Markovian Decision Process (MDP), which assumes the Markovian state transition. This assumption restricts the ability to perform in long horizon scenarios and makes the model unstable when dealing with highly random online advertising environments. To tackle this issue, this paper introduces AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB), a novel paradigm for auto-bidding through generative modeling. In this paradigm, we propose DiffBid, a conditional diffusion modeling approach for bid generation. DiffBid directly models the correlation between the return and the entire trajectory, effectively avoiding error propagation across time steps in long horizons. Additionally, DiffBid offers a versatile approach for generating trajectories that maximize given targets while adhering to specific constraints. Extensive experiments conducted on the real-world dataset and online A/B test on Alibaba advertising platform demonstrate the effectiveness of DiffBid, achieving 2.81% increase in GMV and 3.36% increase in ROI.

Recently, auto-bidding technique has become an essential tool to increase the revenue of advertisers. Facing the complex and ever-changing bidding environments in the real-world advertising system (RAS), state-of-the-art auto-bidding policies usually leverage reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms to generate real-time bids on behalf of the advertisers. Due to safety concerns, it was believed that the RL training process can only be carried out in an offline virtual advertising system (VAS) that is built based on the historical data generated in the RAS. In this paper, we argue that there exists significant gaps between the VAS and RAS, making the RL training process suffer from the problem of inconsistency between online and offline (IBOO). Firstly, we formally define the IBOO and systematically analyze its causes and influences. Then, to avoid the IBOO, we propose a sustainable online RL (SORL) framework that trains the auto-bidding policy by directly interacting with the RAS, instead of learning in the VAS. Specifically, based on our proof of the Lipschitz smooth property of the Q function, we design a safe and efficient online exploration (SER) policy for continuously collecting data from the RAS. Meanwhile, we derive the theoretical lower bound on the safety of the SER policy. We also develop a variance-suppressed conservative Q-learning (V-CQL) method to effectively and stably learn the auto-bidding policy with the collected data.

We establish a general optimization framework for the design of automated bidding agent in dynamic online marketplaces. It optimizes solely for the buyer's interest and is agnostic to the auction mechanism imposed by the seller. As a result, the framework allows, for instance, the joint optimization of a group of ads across multiple platforms each running its own auction format. Bidding strategy derived from this framework automatically guarantees the optimality of budget allocation across ad units and platforms. Common constraints such as budget delivery schedule, return on investments and guaranteed results, directly translates to additional parameters in the bidding formula. We share practical learnings of the deployed bidding system in the LinkedIn ad marketplace based on this framework.